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General propositions
This paper is concerned with the importance of ownership organization in the process of industrial growth and transformation. It is limited to the ownership and controI over industrial companies 1 • Owners, managers and banks have created group s and net-works in order to reduce uncertainty and increase efficiency. When working properly, such group s combine efficient production with structural flexibility.
Industrial competence, technological as weIl as organizational, can grow within such group s and it is possible to transfer this competence between different companies within the group. Owners and banks have the possibility to reallocate scarce resources (capital and managers) rapidly to promote industrial transformation. This ability must be based both on easy access to these resources and on a strategic position in the flow of information.
The successful growth of industrial companies, owner groups and networks around banks institutionalizes traditions and establishes power positions. Stability and predictability are preferred to experiments and radically departures which may devalue existing competence. Long-term successful owner group s are based on the abiIity to revitalize existing institutions through change of management philosophy, mergers and carefully cultivated contacts with other owners, banks and business life in general.
Historically, the Swedish market for ownership and controI has shown a cyclical pattern of behaviour. The early 20th century and the 1980s are characterized by large-scale restructuring of industry and changes of ownership while the intervening period was dominated by stability and low market activity. This raises the question if the active market has played an independent role for restructuring industry and ownership or if it is a response to demands from the real economy on the financial sector. This paper suggests that the first wave was dominated by the dem and for large-scale, integrated industrial organizations while the second wave was primarily an answer to a demand for improved efficiency within these organizations. It also argues that restructuring initiated from the industrial sphere or from owners with close ties to this sphere has been more successful than pure financial ly based efforts from outside. To start, some general propositions are presented to show the importance of understanding the historical dimensions of ownership and innovations. Owner activity could be important in organizing such combinations. It is also important to study if an owner has experience of technical development from the dem and side or from the supply side as this experience probably will form his attitude towards the company. In the case that neither owners nor managers are able to achieve the necessary changes there is an obvious need for an outside controI of efficiency.
B. Institutions (including owners and owner families) which have been created during periods of successful development have accumulated resources, prestige and power as weIl as positive experiences of a certain way of behaviour. As long as the external conditions have not radically changed such an institution may retain its dynamic performance but only on its established field. Such performance is fully compatible with reluctance towards changing the field of activity. Due to accumulated resources (profits, prestige and power) the successful institution also has a considerable ability to resist change. If it lacks the will to act dynamically the institution may in the end be destroyed by adverse external forces. Such a development may be prevented either by successful internaI opposition or by successive adaption of new ideas and methods which may include mergers with other institutions. Active controI and supervision from financial markets is one possibility for industrial companies to keep inertia at bay. It is however a possibility onlyas it requires financial actors who are interested in industrial transformation 3 .
C.
Ownership controI is usually a result of successful entrepreneurial performance in the past. Ownership controI must be based on capital accumulated either in a family or in an institution, either an industrial company or some kind of investment organization. The owners have acquired certain skills, experiences, traditions and prejudices during the accumulation of capital. Their behaviour as owners is guided and moulded not only by their view of the contemporary situation but also by these legacies of the past. (This phenomenon might with advantage be analyzed with transaction cost theory). They are rationaI but their rationality is bounded by their past. The market for ownership and controI is therefore divided by historically and geographically determined borders. Crossing these borders may be an innovative activity in itself. In this paper, capital will be divided into mercantile, industrial and financial capital, according to the experiences and traditions of both owners and managers of the capital.
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D. The meso-leve1 4 may be described as a level of action for several micro-units, aleveI constituted by transaction and information costs for these micro-units. A meso-level (which also could be described as a close-knit network of personal contacts) may be informal or institutionalized, it may be open for entry and exit of members or more or less closed. It is introduced here mainly to stress some basic similarities between informal networks and formal institutions; close contacts, mutual confidence, a common field for action. Such conditions are likely to improve the information flow about the future, minimize uncertainty and risks and create a favourable climate for investments and innovations.
Meso-levels may in a historical perspective be rising or declining, highly dynamic or well-established and undynamic. An efficient and dynamic meso-level gives the micro-units better opportunities by access to rapid information, positive incentives to innovations and investments and opportunities to co-operation with dynamic
entrepreneurs. An inefficient meso-level shields the micro-units from valuable information, thus discouraging innovative efforts (the microunits might have gained better information if they had had more contacts outside such a meso-Ievel). Typical examples of meso-Ievels are close networks of co-operation between businessmen in a city or a region, carteIs, companies with a common bank connection, companies with a common (minority or majority) owner or a large multi-divisional company. In an economic theory where risk, uncertainty and limited information about the future is stressed, micro-units might be presumed to handle these problems by attaching themselves to one or more meso-Ievels.
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Owners usually attaches themselves to one or more meso-Ievels when theyas economic actors try to minimize risks and uncertainty. It is therefore questionable to speak about one single financial market for ownership or control. The active owner may prefer to act in a limited sphere where he can establish intimate contacts with entrepreneurs, managers, customers and bankers. This sphere may be of the same analytical interest as the financial market. The implication of this is that owners who are parts of such meso-levels cannot be expected to act as outside controllers of efficiency within industry. Strong owners are not necessarily the same as a firm controI of efficiency from the financial market. The same may to some ex tent be the case with banks with long-term relations with an industrial company.
2.
The The existence of an independent "technological push" is in my opinion proved beyond reasonable doubt by the persistent efforts to experiment and invest in technical projects which for decades proved unfruitfu1 5 .
The low profitability of such efforts for several decades blocked the way for owners with predominantly industrial interests.
This phase was dominated by family enterprises with none or little separation of ownership and controI (management). Financial markets for ownership and controI did hardly exist. "Business units" (design, production, buying, selling and financing) were not integrated into unified organizations and could not be bought and sold in one package on the market. "Production units" (factories, milIs) could easily be bought and sold but the business units were the merchants personal propert y -of ten simply his personal network of business contactswhich seldom we re transferred outside family and friendship connections. The exceptions were private ly and municipal ly owned railways and the regional banks which were re garde d as essentiaI parts of the regional "meso-Ievels" which were very important in the 19th century.
Efficient regional meso-Ievels we re essentiaI for industrial entrepreneurs as they gave rapid access to other companies and businessmen who could supply credit, complementary industrial and On the whole, however, financial markets in any normal sense of the word had little importance for ownership and controi in industry.
Instead, regional, non-differentiated markets for entrepreneurs, capital, credit, political influence and family alliances (including marriages) were the centres for meeting between innovations, company formation, finance and manageriai activities. The controi of industrial efficiency was largely achieved through social and economic stimuli to the family entrepreneur -he could rise in society through a successful business career. This does not mean that the controi of industrial efficiency was slack or inefficient but it can hardly be described as a predominantly financial control. The base for the new financial market for ownership and controI was a rapidly increasing enthusiasm for investments in industrial shares among the public. Savings which earlier had been invested in real estate, banks or small companies were reallocated to industrial companies whose shares were quoted on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, an institution which was reorganized along modern lines at the beginning of the century. But the bulk of the share-owners were of cours e not the actors on the stage. There were no important institutions or companies which specialized in stock investment as an end in itself.
The actors on the stock market were predominantly of three types. One of these were owners who used the stock market to finance industrial empire-building or industrial restructuring. A second type was the industrial managers who spread the shares of their growing companies to many owners in order to avoid dominating owners. Finally there were the banks whose importance for the new financial market hardly can be overestimated.
The stock market was to a very large extent financed by bank loans with shares as security and the banks were very active in selling shares to the public. They arranged mergers, financed venture capitaIists and bought family companies in order to get both more 
Stabilization 1920 -1970
The long term impression of this period is the stabilization of the owner and company structure which had developed during the industrial break-through period. There were of course some enters and exits of both owners and companies but the basic structure remained much the same. A study of large-scale enterprise during this period must concentrate on possible transformations within the companies, owner groups and bank group s , rather than on entirely new ventures. But it is also necessary to find causes for and consequences of the low degree of entry and exit. Did for example the financial market play any important role?
First it must be remembered that these decades were the great age of Swedish industry when its role as supporting pillar for the growth of welfare was undisputed and its high technology achievements we re generally admired. Industrialists and engineers were respected and admired and they had a considerable latitude in forming a technocratic society witout being questioned. This attitude was predominant among politicians, trade unions and increasingly among the stock investing public. This public had also been taught in a hard way not to trust pure ly financial activities on the stock market.
Stabilization may be the long term impression of the period but to the contemporary observer the 1920s and 1930s were decades of dramatic turmoil on the Swedish stock market. There were dramatic shake-ups of the ownership structure caused by the depressions in the early 20s and early 30s and the special conditions created by the international ly financed Kreuger group. When the debris of these crisis had settled it turned out that the financial ly strong owners, bank groups and industrial companies of 1920 had survived while more speculative (and sometimes also more spectacular) owners were eliminated. Gone were also several older owner group s which had surfed on the expansive economy up to 1920 but which had not real ly been able to adjust to modern large-scale industrial conditions. In southern Sweden a new paper and pulp industry based on the new wood pulp technology developed from the 1850s and onwards. Most of these companies we re small and unprofitable and more fortunes were lost than created before the 1890s. The owners and managers were usually technicians or industrialists with a strong interest in the problems of the production process. In central Sweden (the Bergslagen area), the traditional district for the (largely forest-based) Swedish iron industry, some diversified companies developed when iron industries tried to find new uses for their forest resources. Some of these companies used their profits from the saw-timber boom for financing investments in steel production and experiments with pulp and paper.
They remained bastions for industrial capitaIism, one of the few cases where early industrial windfall profits went straight in to industrial development.
By the end of the 19th century this forest industry was ripe for a large transformation. The exploitation of virgin forests in the north had reached its end and at the same time the dem and for pulp and paper increased steeply. Saw-timber production had (and still has) little of economy of scale and it was a decidedly low-technology industry. Pulp and paper production on the other hand proved to have very large economies of scale and the risks and opportunities were to a large extent technological. While the opportunities for the future was concentrated to the paper and pulp companies, which had the technological know-how, the capital from profits in the past was concentrated to the timber companies. Rich as they were, these companies we re nevertheless of ten too small to become the rationaI base for a modern large-scale paper producer.
The situation required mergers of existing companies and transfer of advanced technology from southern and central Sweden to the north. It also required capital for investments although such capital was available in the northern companies. On the whole the forest industry around 1900 was a highly fascinating field for industrial and financial entrepreneurs with an interest in restructuring. But there were very large obstacles to pass and in the end much of what was done proved to be half-measures.
One obvious problem was that almost all forest companies in north and south were typical family enterprises. Owners with industrial traditions lacked capital and were of ten too much used to small-scale enterprises to become efficient managers of large companies. In the north, the owners were of ten used to rather large-scale activities, but they lacked industrial traditions. Besides, the pioneer generation of entrepreneurs in the north had now been succeeded by second and third generation owners, who general ly were less dynamic. It is fairly obvious that an efficient market for ownership and con tro l was necessary for a successful transformation of the forest industry.
The first two decades of the 20th century saw some promising restructuring but also several investments which proved to be unfortunate in the long run. Several small pulp and paper companies in the south changed owners and several mergers took place here. In central Sweden some large-scale investments in modern and rationaI production facilities were made by large companies with strong industrial traditions and easy access to the financial markets. These mergers and investments formed the basis for the Swedish paper industry for much of the 20th century.
In the north the development became dramatic. For a long time the great saw-mill owners had been negative or hesitant towards investments in pulp and paper. They now made frenetic efforts to regain lost grounds and added a pulp mill to their assets. They remained exporters of semi-finished products and it is probable that their lack of industrial traditions made their pulp production less economical than it might have been. What is obvious is that their pulp milIs could have been more profitable if they had joined efforts and built large-scale plants instead of providing every large company with at least one and of ten two milIs (usually one sulphite and one sulphate mill), sometimes only a few hundred meters from another company's similar mill. The motive was to show the company's ambition to remain independent, not any attempt to use a technology which had been developed in the company.
During the 1920s most of the surviving family companies in northern Sweden were severely hit by a financial crisis which final ly eliminated their once very rich owners. The obvious reason were misjudgment of the post-war economic situation. A possible but historically uninvestigated additional cause for the exceptionally heavy crisis which hit these companies was the large investments in pulp production without sufficient industrial know-how. A large-scale merger of several of these companies followed in the end of the decade (the SCA company). In the end the financial markets for ownership and controI had worked although it was the banking sector and Ivar Kreuger rather than the stock market which were the main actors. But from an industrial point of view it could be argued that it was too little and too late.
The basic investments in pulp milIs in northern Sweden had been made in 1900-1930, before the mergers. It would take half a century to rationalize this industrial structure. Second, very few investments in paper production had been made in the north, in spite of the very good supply of pulp and cheap electrical power. Lack of industrial traditions were obviously the main reason but this meant that the companies and the whole area were tied to the production of semifinished products, much more sensitive to depressions than paper production. Third, the mergers which had taken place were based on To understand the balance of power it is first of all necessary to point to the high degree of autonomy which the leading managers have been able to maintain. During the first half of the 20th century manager dynas ties were a normal feature among these companies.
Presidents, vice-presidents and other leading managers we re regularly elected among sons, sons-in-law, brothers-in-law and nephew s to a dominating and successful company president. It is obvious that such a president had a decisive position in selecting and training young men to future leaders and that they of ten used this power to promote family interests. When the question of appointing a new senior staff member arose, owners of ten had no other choice than to take a relative to the president who had an excellent in-house training for the job. The more sub tIe controI which is necessary to check tendencies towards stagnation and lack of efficiency is more difficult to observe from outside 11
• It may be exercised through owners, bankers or the selfdiscipline which dependence on financial markets may inspire among managers. In a very long-term perspective some tendencies are observable among the large and persistently successful engineering companies with which we are concerned here. First, it is normal that the centre of power within the companies has shifted from time to time. Managers, owners and banks have during different period exercised a dynamic influence over the company. Af ter a long period without change of leadership certain tendencies to stagnation are discernible while bursts of dynamic behaviour are observable af ter changes of leadership. We have to use such rather vague terms as "change of leadership" because it is far from always easily observable phenomenons such as a new owner or a new president which are decisive.
A new president who has made his career within the company may be content with following traditions while an established owner suddenly may become active and take the lead without necessarily changing president. We have to observe changes from within the company to know more about the effects of financial markets.
Second, it seems obvious that the large engineering companies longterm position as public companies with most of their shares spread among many investors has had some effects on manageriaI performance. A manager who wish to remain independent of owner group s and banks must retain the confidence of the share-holders in order to keep company raiders away and to have access to a market for new issues of shares. 
The financial market for ownership and control -a final note
We are back to a basic argument of this paper. Financial markets for ownership and control cannot be studied without some knowledge of the actors on this market. This knowledge must contain a historical dimension as all actors on the market have a history, institutional and personal. Historical knowledge about the market also gives us perspectives on to which extent the market is something timeless and to which extent it merely reflects the conditions and power structure of contemporary society.
In a long-term perspective the Swedish financial market for ownership and controI has had two periods of greatness. The first, from about 1900 to 1920, was dominated by the large-scale inflow of savings from the public to the rapidly growing industry. The stock market was thus a key instrument for financing the new Swedish industry without recourse to foreign capital. But as the market to a large extent was developed by the veryactors who also created the new industry, no tradition of financial controI of industry from outside by independent organizations (investment trusts, insurance companies, saving funds) emerged. In the stabilization phase, from 1920 and half a century onwards, no such tradition developed, neither did the institutionaI framework which might have given small-scale investors a voice in efficiency control. As most industries and banks had the majority of their shares spread among the public it is probable that the financial market had a disciplinating influence on their managers and main owners but this influence was very seldom visible in concrete actions from the market. The controlling blocks of stocks were of ten surprisingly small, a fact which illustrates the low degree of competition between owners. 
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This paper is mainly based on Glete (1987) which also have an extensive list of literature.
2
See for example Kamien & Schwartz (1982), pp. 22-23, 33-36, 58-64. 3 Stagnation phenomenons are of cours e very much discussed in the literature but we are still lacking any coherent theory about why stagnation occurs and how it could change into dynamic performance.
4 The term "meso-level" (a level between micro and macro) is taken from de Feyter (1982) . It is used here in a mu ch wider sense than by de Feyter. 8 It is typical that the two real ly large industries which have grown up af ter 1920, Volvo and SAAB, were founded as daughter companies to existing large-scale enterprises.
